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ABSTRACT 
Using academic studies and financial literature from over 40 researchers, I investigate if 
behavioral finance causes investors to not always act in a rational manner. In this thesis, I 
review the literature on investor behavior and outline the situational factors that 
contribute to investment decisions that are not consistent with the theory of rational 
expectations. In particular, I synthesize the departure from the theoretical standard due to 
gender bias, risk-taking, over confidence based on gender as well as institutional 
compared to individual investors, investor biases, external environmental influences, and 
lastly, herd behavior. 
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Introduction 
	  
Numerous fundamental theories of finance and modern economics rely on the 
assumption that participants have homogenous expectations and are rational. A rational 
investor is defined as an individual whose decision-making process is based on 
optimizing his or her level of wealth or benefit. The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) is an equilibrium model that provides the foundation for many of today’s 
modern financial theories. CAPM is used to find a theoretically applicable required rate 
of return of an asset while taking into account the asset’s sensitivity to non-diversifiable 
risk, the expected return of the market, and the expected return of a hypothetical risk-free 
asset. The fundamental basis of CAPM relies on several assumptions, one being that 
investors are rational mean-variance optimizers (Mullins 1982). The area in finance that 
takes into consideration the fact that market participants may not always behave 
rationally has been termed behavioral finance.  
Countless authors have pointed out various examples of market participants not 
behaving completely rationally due to various internal and external factors. Several 
behavioral discrepancies are found between men and women in regards to financial 
decision making. To name a few, Charness and Gneezy (2011) conduct several studies 
relating to the level of risk-aversion preferred by males compared to females. In 2001, 
Barber and Odean explore whether males or females tend to be more overconfident when 
it comes to making investment decisions. Tekce, Yilmaz, and Bildik (2016) analyze the 
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consequences of the disposition effect, familiarity bias, and status quo bias and show 
that these predispositions are rampant among investors.  
The remainder of this paper will synthesize the literature and academic studies from 
several renowned researchers, showing how behavioral finance can effect a ‘rational’ 
investor’s decision making process. By exploring the following categories of internal 
investor characteristics, biased tendencies, and environmental factors, this thesis aims to 
show that market participants do not always behave entirely rationally.
	  
	  
3	  
Chapter I: Risk Taking 
Most economic and financial transactions involve taking on some form of risk, which 
explains why there is a substantial amount of research dedicated to trying to understand 
how risk is incorporated when investors make decisions. There are numerous underlying 
factors that can potentially cause individuals to take on levels of risk that are not 
completely rational. For example, several investor characteristics, such as IQ, financial 
literacy, and stock market participation can cause investors to assume more or less risk. 
Similarly, regarding investment decision making, the gender of the investor can also 
affect the amount of risk he or she is willing to take. This section explores the disparity 
between risk that men are willing to take with investments compared to women. There 
are several studies that seek to explain the underlying causes of the difference in assumed 
risk between genders, such as perceived knowledge sets, general traits, and stock market 
participation.    
 
a.   Investor characteristics 
Although individuals have become increasingly more active in financial markets 
as the result of easier access to new financial products and services, in the United States 
only about 50% of households invest in stocks (Grinblatt, Keloharju, Linnainmaa, 2011). 
In Europe, participation in the stock market is even lower. Research performed by Mark 
Grinblatt, Matti Keloharju, and Juhani Linnainmaa (2011) seeks to explain how 
participation in the stock market, and perceived risk taken on by individual investors, is
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correlated to IQ. By studying participation in the Finnish stock market at the end of 2000 
as a function of IQ, the relation between IQ and various other factors contributing to 
portfolio risk and return are studied. The researchers obtain IQ data for Finnish males in 
their twenties because scores are gathered upon entering Finland’s mandatory military 
service at this age. Stock ownership and mutual fund ownership data is also obtained, 
along with the tax returns from 2000 of all of the inductees. The results of the study 
imply that lack of cognitive skill is a fundamental driver of nonparticipation, and is 
potentially what deters large sums of wealth from entering the stock market. 
         The researchers were able to use the data they gathered to conclude that Higher-
IQ participants are more likely to hold mutual funds, hold a larger number of stocks, and 
maintain lower-beta portfolios than lower-IQ participants. High-IQ subjects participate 
more often because they face a superior risk return trade off, and low-IQ subjects are less 
willing to participate because they are more prone to making investment mistakes. In 
order to determine if low-IQ subjects’ unwillingness to participate derives from a risk-
averse standpoint, Sharpe ratios were estimated from participant’s risky portfolios of 
individual mutual funds, then regressed against IQ and controls. 
        The results of this study strongly imply that one’s IQ early in adult life is directly 
correlated to participation in the stock market, as well as portfolio diversification later in 
life.  As Figure 1 shows, there are more market participants in every above-average IQ 
stanine, and comparatively less participants in every below-average IQ stanine. Since 
high-IQ investors are more likely to participate in the stock market, their Sharpe ratios 
tend to be higher. A higher Sharpe ratio indicates that the investor can expect to receive 
more excess return on their investment, given the extra volatility they are exposed to by 
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holding a riskier asset. Investors with higher IQ’s are therefore more likely to be willing 
to take on additional risk by participating in the stock market and diversifying their 
portfolios through holding mutual funds and larger numbers of stocks. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of IQ scores conditional on market participation 
 
Source: Grinblatt, Keloharju, Linnainmaa (2011) 
 
Maarten van Rooij, Annamaria Lusardi, and Rob Alessie (2011) conducted a 
similar study, but instead looked at how an individuals’ financial literacy affects financial 
decision-making and participation in the stock market. The researchers find that a lack of 
understanding finance and economics is a significant deterrent to stock ownership. 
Therefore, they reached the similar conclusion that those with low financial literacy are 
much less likely to invest in stocks. Considering the relation between IQ and financial 
literacy, it is likely that the higher an individual’s IQ, the more financially literate, and 
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the more likely they will participate in the stock market. This evidence is also consistent 
with the work performed by Vising-Jorgensen (2004), who found that sophisticated 
investors tend to behave more rationally, compared to unsophisticated investors, who 
appear less rational.  
 
b.   Male vs. Female 
Johan Almenberg and Anna Dreber (2015) took a similar approach to the 
previously mentioned study, but by adding another variable, they not only analyze the 
correlation between stock market participation and financial literacy, but were also able 
to study the relation of gender with these factors. Previous findings have concluded that 
women participate in the stock market less than men (van Rooij et al., 2011), and also 
tend to be less financially literate than men (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008; OECD, 2013). 
Almenberg and Dreber seek to determine if the gender gap in stock market participation 
is a direct result of disparities in levels of financial literacy by studying a random sample 
of the Swedish population and measuring their financial literacy, based on a scale from a 
basic understanding to advanced knowledge. 
The results obtained indicate that women are less likely than men to participate in 
the stock market, while women also score lower on basic and advanced financial literacy 
and knowledge. Therefore, these results imply that the gender gap in stock market 
participation can be attributed largely to gender differences in financial literacy- also 
forecasting the next series of questions, if basic financial literacy for women is raised, 
would the gender gap in stock market participation be closed? 
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It is a common principal of economics that to earn a higher return, one must take 
on more risk. It has already been established that more frequent participation in the stock 
market results in taking on higher levels of risk, and men are likely to participate more 
often than women. This gender disparity leads into the next set of questions regarding the 
relation between gender and risk when it comes to making financial decisions. 
Over the years, several scholars have written academic literature eluding to the 
idea that women are less likely than men to engage in risky investments. As previously 
discussed, Almenberg and Dreber (2015) provided results that imply that women are less 
financially literate than men, which potentially causes them to take part in less risky 
investment decisions. A caveat of this type of analyses is that these large-scale studies do 
not control for potential gender differences in knowledge sets – they had not evaluated 
the effect of context-specific knowledge on the investment decisions people made.  
In 2001, Dwyer, Gilkeson, and List conducted a study using national survey data 
from roughly 2000 mutual fund investors. They investigate the relation between the 
gender of the investor and the level of risk taking, in regards to mutual fund investment 
decisions, while holding the financial investment knowledge of individual investors 
constant. Mutual fund data was used because mutual funds are common investment 
choices for many people and are consistently discussed in the popular press, therefore 
providing a relatively unambiguous decision context for both men and women. 
The survey used for data collection was conducted jointly by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Securities Exchange Commission in 1995. Dwyer, 
Gilkeson, and List (2001) randomly selected 2000 mutual fund investors, and asked the 
participants a series of questions regarding their demographic traits, the types of mutual 
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funds they owned, where they purchased these mutual funds, as well as questions to 
determine their knowledge of basic financial concepts. In regards to the question for type 
of fund owned, the study focused on three isolated pieces of information: “the type of 
mutual fund that respondents had purchased for their largest single investment, their most 
recent (last) investment, and their riskiest investment” (152). In order to measure the 
riskiest investment for mutual funds, the researchers coded the fund types on a scale from 
0-4, with 0 being the lowest risk level and 4 being the highest. Money market and 
municipal money market funds received a 0, municipal bond funds received a 1, bond 
funds received a 2, mixed/balanced funds received a 3, and stock funds received a 4. Due 
to complications regarding participants’ largest investment category, the researchers 
decided to modify their study and shorten the remaining responses, leading to a 0-3 risk 
scale for this category (money market:0, municipal bond:1, mixed:2, and stock:3). The 
researchers found overwhelming evidence that, across the three investment categories, 
women took less risk in their investments than men. The researchers realize that there are 
other factors besides gender that influence risk taking, such as education, age, and 
income, therefore they collected data on these attributes as well. 
         The results did not differ in respect to age, but income and education levels 
reported by men tended to be higher than the levels reported by women. The researchers 
perceived that knowledge of specific investment practices is correlated to preferences for 
the level of risk of investments. Investment knowledge of the respondents was measured 
by the responses to 12 questions that had scores from 0 to 12. Six of the twelve questions 
required answers that could be associated to a known answer (correct answers=1, 
incorrect=1). The remaining six questions used a yes or no format to measure each 
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individual’s self-reported understanding of financial and investment concepts and terms 
(yes=1, no=0). The result of these findings conclude that men and women have different 
knowledge sets in regard to investment decisions (average score for women was 6.20, 
and 7.67 for men), and therefore the results of differences in risk preferences may be due 
to men and women’s differences in investment knowledge. These results are consistent 
with the previous study performed by Almenberg and Dreber (2015). 
         After calculating empirical results for the regression on each of the three 
dependent variables (largest, last, and riskiest investment types) and including the 
variable for investor knowledge, the results imply that “wealthier, more educated 
investors tend to take on more risk than their less educated, less wealthy counterparts” 
(156). 
         The empirical results concerning gender differences, imply that when the measure 
of investor knowledge was excluded, men take on more risk than women when selecting 
mutual funds. However, when investor knowledge is included, gender differences are 
only significant in terms of the riskiest investment. The results for respondent’s largest 
mutual fund investments show that men are roughly 5% more likely than women to 
invest in stock funds (deemed the riskiest type of mutual fund for this study), and are 
3.4% less likely than women to invest in money market funds (the lowest risk). 
         Although this study found evidence that suggests women take less risk than men 
in their mutual fund investments, it has also been observed that the difference in risk 
taking can also be attributed to level of financial knowledge each investor possesses. 
Determining if men are more willing than women to take financial risks 
demonstrates an immediate relevance for many concerns in the economy today. Gary 
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Charness and Uri Gneezy (2011) pursue an understanding of important differences in risk 
taking between groups, primarily the gender of the decision makers. The idea that women 
are more risk averse than men is a common stereotype that plays a role in important 
behavioral tendencies throughout the financial industry. Although several empirical 
investigations regarding risk taking in relation to gender differences point in the direction 
that women take less risk than men, these results are hard to compare. These 
incomparable results pose a major problem because the experiments vary in their 
methods used to study the phenomenon, and they often use different decision problems.  
Another issue is that some studies were specifically designed to test for gender 
differences, while others found differences without trying to look for them. Charness and 
Gneezy (2011) have found difficulty substantiating other studies’ results regarding 
gender disparity in risk taking because it is hard to know how many experiments were 
actively looking for gender differences in risk taking and did not find them. Therefore, 
they feel as if they are left with a “selection bias with a positive finding” (51) because it 
is easier for researchers to publish articles that report finding a gender difference in risk 
taking versus a study that does not report a difference.  
Charness and Gneezy (2011) set out to solidify the answers to questions regarding 
risk taking between men and women. They systematically collect existing empirical 
results from 15 sets of experiments, containing thousands of different researchers’ 
observations that were conducted in various environments, but based on one simple 
investment game. A majority of these experiments were conducted by different 
researchers, in different countries, with different subject pools, procedures, ages etc. and 
were not designed to investigate gender differen
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order to study risk taking by gender, the researchers do not have uniform designs to their 
experiments, and the assortment allows the strength of the hypothesis to be tested. 
The data acquired is centered around an investment decision, that was presented 
by Gneezy and Potters in 1997, where the decision maker receives “X” amount of dollars, 
and the only decision the participants make in the experiment is how much they wish to 
keep and how much they wish to invest in a risky option (“x”). “The amount invested 
yields a dividend of $kx (k > 1) with probability p and is lost with probability 1 − p. The 
money not invested $(X − x) is kept by the investor. The payoffs are then $(X − x + kx) 
with probability p, and $(X − x) with 1 − p. In all cases, p and k are chosen so that p × k 
> 1, making the expected value of investing higher that the expected value of not 
investing; thus, a risk-neutral (or risk-seeking) person should invest $X, while a risk-
averse person may invest less. The choice of x is the only decision the participants make 
in the experiment” (51). The researchers reported data from each study they were aware 
used this method of testing for risk aversion. Despite the differences in demographics and 
environments among the sets of experiments, Charness and Gneezy found results that 
men consistently choose a higher “x” than women do.  
         Charness and Gneezy (2001) were able to establish a significant and consistent 
gender difference in investment choices, as can be seen from their results in the six panels 
on Figure 2. When compared to men, women make smaller investments in risky assets, 
and therefore appear to be more economically risk averse. While the researchers are not 
arguing that women are always more risk averse than men, they believe that these 
findings regarding investment decisions will provide an “important step in understanding 
the important features of gender differences in risk taking” (57). 
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Figure 2: 
Source: Charness, Gneezy (2001) 
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Due to the increase of women participating in the workforce, more attention is 
being paid to gender differences in financial decision-making, especially regarding levels 
of risk. Melanie Powell and David Ansic (1997) explore whether gender differences in 
risk-taking tendencies and financial decision making strategies are due to general traits, 
or if these differences arise due to contextual factors. By analyzing the results of two 
systematic laboratory experiments, the researchers seek to answer questions regarding the 
role that framing of tasks as well as the level an individuals’ familiarity to the task might 
play in an investor’s risk preference and decision strategies for men and women. The 
researchers compare the decision behavior of males and females in financial situations of 
various familiarity and framing, in order to determine the degree, if any, to which women 
display more risk averse behavior than men. 
Several psychological and demographic studies have found evidence implying the 
existence of gender differences in business decision-making, as previously discussed. 
Although psychologists have concluded that their discoveries yield confirmation of these 
differences, it is still undetermined if the results represent evidence of general traits rather 
than contextual responses to social and environmental factors. Some studies prior to 1980 
suggest that women are “more cautious, less confident, less aggressive, easier to 
persuade, and have inferior leadership and problem solving abilities when making 
decisions under risk compared to men, reinforcing stereotypical views that women are 
less able managers” (607); however, more recent studies have shown that gender 
differences in business decision-making are more ambiguous compared to prior belief 
(Johnson and Powell, 1994). Although contemporary research demonstrates less 
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significant findings of gender differences in financial abilities, there has been consistent 
evidence that women tend to possess a lower preference of risk (608). 
While some of these gender differences are interpreted as resulting from general 
traits, others could be explained by various methodical approaches to the studies, such as 
the subject’s familiarity or experience to the situation. Familiarity can be linked to the 
way individuals identify with their own gender role in regards to decision making, 
specifically, studies have found that masculine influence and feminine articulateness 
were significant determinants of decision making skills (Radeckie and Jaccard, 1996). 
Another aspect that could affect risk behavior is the framing of questions 
regarding decisions. Evidence was found implying that when decision based questions 
are framed in terms of losses instead of gains, behavioral differences are more 
pronounced (Dickson 1982). Therefore, gender differences may seem to be more evident 
when framed in terms of losses, and less evident when framed in terms of gains. Due to 
the methodical issues of familiarity and framing, Powell and Ansic (1997) test their 
hypothesis that gender differences are associated with a difference in decision strategy 
because females tend to have lower risk preferences than males when tasks are framed in 
terms of losses instead of gains, when tasks are familiar, and when costs associated with 
decisions or levels of ambiguity are high (610). This study is conducted in order to 
examine the importance of factors that vary between different instances in the general 
context of financial decision making. 
Powell and Ansic (1997) created a decision environment for their study that was 
computer based because they wanted to be sure that individuals were receiving the same 
information. A computer screen also realistically represents the environment that several 
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individuals use to make financial decisions, while also removing the issue of peer 
pressure. Undergraduate and post-graduate students were selected from the business 
school to participate in the study, which consisted of two separate experiments. Both 
experiments involved making financial decisions under uncertainty, but different cases of 
task frames and levels of familiarity were incorporated. The second represented 
unfamiliar decision making related to entering or leaving a currency market. Information 
about re-entering that same currency market and the corresponding exchange rates were 
given to participants, but was framed in terms of gains. Participants were paid the value 
of the results from one of their decisions, chosen at random, to be sure subjects had 
incentives to actively participate. 
The first experiment gave participants a choice of insurance coverage, so both 
males and females would be familiar and have similar amounts of experience, and was 
framed in terms of losses. Participants made 12 independent insurance decisions, with the 
goal of maximizing wealth holdings. After subjects were given assets and cash, 
information regarding the cost of insurance, and the risk of potential loss, they were 
asked to make a choice about insuring their assets. Prior to making their decisions, they 
were also informed that the insurance premium, their wealth, or the nature of risk would 
change for each decision; as well as the fact that the value of their assets would either 
remain the same, be halved through damage or fall to zero if a disaster occurred after 
their insurance decisions were made. Before the event, they were given five insurance 
options to choose from: “to insure against damage to insure against disaster, to insure 
against both, not to insure at all, or to ‘pass’ and let the computer make a random choice 
for them” (613), and after each of their decisions their subsequent level of wealth was 
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documented on the screen to help the participant keep track of their performance. Lastly, 
subjects were allowed as much time as they wanted to make their decisions, but were not 
aware that time it took them to decide was being monitored. Once the participants 
completed the experiment, they were asked to complete a questionnaire. 
The post experiment questionnaire revealed no significant gender differences in 
past experience and knowledge of insurance coverage, as well as no significant gender 
difference in the participants’ understanding of the process and perception related to the 
difficulty of the tasks. In order for Ansic and Powell (1997) to test the hypothesis that 
females tend to have a lower risk preference than males, the frequency of the chosen 
insurance coverage was analyzed. The study found that men chose damage coverage 
more frequently, where women chose disaster coverage more frequently; hence, the 
conclusion that females show a lower risk preference than males regarding their behavior 
measured by their choice of insurance coverage. 
Ansic and Powell (1997) also measured the time it took participants to make 
decisions in order to identify differences in decision making strategies. They found that 
males took an overall significantly longer time to make choices, compared to females. 
The results also show that strategies for both men and women involve analyzing 
statistical information and patterns of variation, but males tend to consider more sources 
of information. While testing the impact of ambiguity on gender and risk strategy, it was 
found that when the degree of ambiguity was higher, and the risk indicator was low, the 
longest amount of time was taken to make a decision. Therefore, the level of ambiguity is 
a more essential element of risk strategy than gender, and “there is no evidence to suggest 
that gender differences in strategy are affected by the ambiguity of the task” (618). 
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The second study conducted by Ansic and Powell (1997) involved 66 male and 35 
female participants, and was similar to the previous insurance experiment. The volunteers 
were asked to trade currency within a time constraint, under conditions of the four 
different seasons, represented by different entry costs into the market. Participants were 
given an initial amount of cash, and level of earnings was dependent on the ECU-dollar 
exchange rate. If the rate was higher than the entry rate, the participants earned more. The 
cost of entry increased throughout each of the 4 rounds, and subjects were allowed to 
leave the market at any time, but once leaving, no additional gains could be made. 
The purpose of this study was to place participants in an environment that was not 
familiar to them, and have them trade without prior experience. The amount of time spent 
in the market was measured as the time in the market when price is below entry price. 
Most individuals will need to be sure of making gains on re-entry as the re-entry cost 
rises, and therefore will spend less time in the market overall. The results of this 
experiment show that females demonstrate a lower risk preference because they were 
more likely to withdraw from the market before maximizing their profit, compared to 
males. 
         These two experiments revealed evidence on gender differences in risk behavior 
relevant to financial decision making by examining the impact of framing, cost 
ambiguity, and familiarity as context factors that determine risk factors. The evidence 
from these experiments imply that “gender differences in financial risk preference exist in 
management populations and are not explained by the context instance of familiarity, 
ambiguity or gains and loss of framing” (623). The results show that females are less 
risk-seeking than men. Although men and women tend to adopt different strategies in 
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their financial decision making, their respective strategies do not have a substantial 
impact on their ability to perform. Lastly, these studies suggest that “because strategies 
are more easily observed than either risk preference or outcomes in day to day decisions, 
strategy differences may reinforce stereotypical beliefs that females are less able financial 
managers” (605) compared to men. 
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Chapter II: Overconfidence 
Overconfidence by investors is another example of a behavioral attribute that can 
cause individuals to not act purely rationality. Two seminal, but different, studies of the 
effect overconfidence has on investment decisions deal with gender bias and institutional 
investors compared to individual investors. Substantial contributors to the gender bias 
research literature are Brad M. Barber and Terrance Odean, who provide research and 
insight regarding the differences in overconfident investing between men and women, 
and the reasons behind the incongruity. Overconfidence in investors is also examined on 
the basis of whether informed professional investors display more overconfident behavior 
than uninformed individual investors.  
 
a.   Gender Bias  
Several theoretical models predict that excessive trading can be due to 
overconfidence of investors. Meanwhile, psychological research suggests that, in 
financial areas, men tend to be more overconfident than women. Therefore, combining 
these two rationales, it is expected that men will tend to trade more excessively than 
women. In the study “Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock 
Investment”, Brad M. Barber and Terrance Odean (2001) analyze the common stock 
investments of men and women from February of 1991 to January of 1997. 
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Barber and Odean (2001) believe that “human beings are overconfident about 
their abilities, their knowledge and their future prospects” (261) and this overconfidence 
explains the high levels of trading that occur on financial markets. Odean [1998] explains 
that overconfident investors are those who “believe the precision of their knowledge 
about the value of a security is greater than it actually is” (261). They believe more 
strongly in the accuracy of their own personal valuations of securities, and less in the 
assessments of others. This sense of overconfidence leads to more frequent trading, the 
tendency to exhaust more resources than necessary, and lower expected utilities due to 
unrealistic beliefs related to high levels of returns. Rational investors “only trade and 
purchase information when doing so increases their expected utility” (263), therefore, 
overconfident investors trade more excessively and hold riskier portfolios than rational 
investors. 
The tendency for individuals to overestimate their precision of knowledge has 
been observed in several professional fields, and “overconfidence is greatest for difficult 
tasks, for forecasts with low predictability, and for undertakings lacking fast, clear 
feedback” (263).  Barber and Odean (2001) analyze common stock investments of men 
and women because stock selection is a task where people tend to express high levels of 
overconfidence. Choosing common stocks that will outperform is a difficult task, with 
low predictability, and feedback is unclear. 
Men and women can both exhibit overconfidence, however several studies have 
shown evidence that men tend to exhibit more overconfident behavioral tendencies. As 
previously discussed, women are more inclined to express financially risk-averse 
behavior compared to men, which causes females to display more caution while making 
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financial-decisions, and therefore trade less frequently than males. Since overconfidence 
and excessive trading go hand in hand, it can be assumed that men to be more confident 
than women in regards to their ability of making common stock investment decisions. 
Barber and Odean (2001) expand on the findings of psychologists who have 
found that in financial areas, men express more overconfidence than women; leading to 
the hypothesis that “men will trade more often than women, and the performance of men 
will be hurt more by excessive trading than the performance of women” (262).  By 
analyzing account data obtained from a large discount brokerage firm, the researchers 
focused on the common stock investments for over 35,000 households that the gender of 
the person who opened the household’s account can be identified. By testing this 
prediction on the basis of gender as a variable, a natural proxy for overconfidence is 
provided. 
The primary data set is information on the investments of 78,000 households, 
obtained from the same large brokerage firm for six years beginning December, 1996. 
Information regarding the end of month positions and trade history allow Barber and 
Odean (2001) to estimate monthly returns beginning February 1991 through January 
1997. The secondary data set is demographic information, also provided by the brokerage 
firm, that identifies the gender of the person who opened the household’s first account at 
the firm. Information on roughly 35,000 households was provided, of which 79% of 
accounts were opened by males and 21% were opened by females. 
In order to calculate the investment performance of men and women, the gross 
and net return performance for each household is computed. After reasonably accounting 
for an impact in the market, commissions, and bid ask spread of each individual trade, the 
	  
	  
22	  
net return performance is calculated. In order to estimate the gross monthly return on 
each common stock investment, two simplifying assumptions were made that yield slight 
differences in return calculations. The first assumes that all securities are bought or sold 
on the last day of the month. Therefore, the returns earned on stocks purchased from the 
purchase date to the end of the month are ignored, and the returns earned on the stocks 
sold from the sale date to the end of the month are included. The second assumption, is 
that intermonth trading is ignored, but short term trades that yield a position at the end of 
the month are included in the analysis. Monthly portfolio turnover was calculated as one-
half the monthly sales turnover plus one-half the monthly purchase turnover for each 
household. 
Barber and Odean (2001) also calculated an ‘own-benchmark’ abnormal return 
for individual investors that represents the potential return that the household would have 
earned had they held their beginning-of-year portfolio for the entire year. For example, if 
the household did not trade throughout the year, their abnormal return relative to the 
benchmark would be zero for each of the 12 months throughout the year. Since there is 
no universally accepted model of risk, using the own-benchmark abnormal return 
measure is advantageous because it does not adjust returns according a specific risk 
model. The own-benchmark model allows each household to individually select the risk 
profile and investment style they prefer, which emphasizes the effect trading has on 
performance (274). Because inferior security selection could also be a cause of 
underperformance, it was measured by comparing the returns of stocks bought with the 
returns of stocks sold. 
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The results from this study conclude that women tend to hold slightly smaller 
common stock portfolios, and women turn over their portfolios less than men (53% 
annually for women compared to 77% annually for men). Comparing returns to those 
earned by the portfolios held at the beginning of the year, women earned gross monthly 
returns that were 0.041% lower, while men earned gross monthly returns that were 
0.069% lower, which yields a 0.34% difference annually. Regarding net-own benchmark 
returns, it was found that net monthly returns compared to the portfolio held at the 
beginning of the year were 0.143% lower for women and .0221% lower for men, which is 
a 0.94% difference annually. Both of these shortcomings are significant, and show that 
men and women both reduce their returns by trading, but men tend to do so more 
frequently. 
In conclusion, Barber and Odean’s (2001) empirical results are consistent with 
their predictions that men trade more frequently because they are more overconfident. 
Compared to women, men lower their returns due to excessive trading, not because their 
security selections are worse. These findings also support the behavioral finance model. 
Individuals turn over their common stock investments about 70% annually and mutual 
funds have similar turnover rates, but the individuals and funds that trade the most tend to 
earn the lowest rates.  Barber and Odean believe that overconfidence explains the high 
levels of counterproductive trading in financial markets (289). These results are 
consistent with results obtained by Tekce and Yilmaz (2015), who also found strong 
evidence that implies that males tend to exhibit more overconfident behavior, and 
overconfidence has a negative effect on portfolio wealth. 
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Mark Grinblatt and Matti Keloharju (2009) conduct a similar study to Barber and 
Odean’s (2001), but by controlling gender (focusing only on males), they attempt to 
determine if a portion of trading is driven by behavioral attributes. In particular, they 
focus on the extent that the role of sensation seeking and overconfidence play on the 
tendency for investors to trade stocks.  
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) recognize that gender can be linked to several 
other attributes that can potentially affect trading, and therefore also focus on analyzing 
sensation seeking as a motivation for trading. Sensation seeking is defined as a 
measurable psychological trait that crosses many domains and is linked to risky behavior, 
such as gambling, risky driving, drug abuse, and frequent career changes. Sensation 
seekers tend to search for a variety of intense experiences, “generally associated with real 
or imagined physical, social, and financial risks” (550). Trading fits this definition of 
sensation seeking, and is therefore explored as a cause for participation in the stock 
market. In this study, sensation seeking is measured using number of speeding tickets an 
investor in the Finnish Stock Market was given over the course of a multiyear period. 
Zuckerman (1994), an initial pioneer of the concept of sensation seeking, suggests that 
one of the best observed behaviors for assessing sensation seeking is driving, hence the 
use of speeding tickets as a measure. 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) define overconfidence similar to Barber and 
Odean (2001), as the tendency to irrationally place an excessive degree of confidence in 
one’s own abilities and beliefs. In this study, overconfidence is measured by obtaining 
data from a standard psychological assessment that is given to all Finnish males prior to 
serving mandatory military service. 
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The results of this study indicate that men who are sensation seekers and exhibit 
more overconfidence trade more frequently, therefore, some portion of trading is driven 
by behavioral attributes. As can be seen in the results in Figure 3, men trade more than 
women within all age groups tested. These findings coincide with the empirical results of 
Barber and Odean’s (2001) study, where they also find that overconfident investors, 
generally men, trade more excessively. 
 
Figure 3: Average Number of Trades as a Function of Gender and Birth Year 
Source: Grinblatt Keloharju (2009) 
 
b.   Institutional vs. Individual Investors 
Gender differences are not the only distinguishing factors that can be analyzed for 
discrepancies pertaining to overconfidence, as several researchers have analyzed the level 
of overconfidence of professional investors versus individual investors. As previously 
stated, Barber and Odean (2001) show that the higher the degree of overconfidence of an 
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investor, the more excessively he/she tends to trade. Excessive trading, in turn, causes the 
investor to choose higher-risk investments. It is very common for financial professionals 
such as investment advisors, analysts, and fund managers to display overconfident 
behavior (Moore and Healy, 2008; Menkhoff et al., 2006; Törngren and Montgomery, 
2004). 
M.H Broihanne, M. Merli, and P. Roger (2014) conducted research that 
demonstrates the role that overconfidence and risk perception plays in financial 
professionals’ risk-taking behavior. The researchers state that “overconfidence manifests 
itself through miscalibration of probabilities, better than average effect, illusions of 
control and unrealistic optimism” (65).  By using two different measures of 
miscalibration, they focus on the effects of overconfidence. 
Sixty-four high level professionals were interviewed and asked a series of 10 
questions that related to risk attitude, risk perception, overconfidence, risk taking, and 
expectations. The results showed that financial professionals are overconfident in not 
only financial domains, but also general domains. This conclusion is reinforced by the 
professionals’ amplitude of their confidence, which leads to overconfident forecasting of 
future stock prices. Broihanne, Merli, and Roger (2014) also found that the risk that 
financial professionals were willing to assume was positively influenced by 
overconfidence and optimism, however was negatively influenced by risk perception. 
In the preceding study, it was determined that financial professionals tend to 
exhibit overconfidence in multiple domains, but the study failed to compare the 
overconfident tendency of professional investors to individual investors. Numerous 
researchers explore the degree of overconfidence for making investment decisions 
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between these two categories. Guided by Barber and Odean’s (2001) previously 
discussed hypothesis that states, overconfidence leads to excessive trading, Wen-I 
Chuang and Rauli Susmel (2011) seek to determine who is more overconfident with their 
trading, individual or institutional investors. 
Chuang and Susmel (2011) chose to analyze Asian markets, specifically the 
Tawainese market, due to psychologists’ findings that Asian cultures exhibit more 
overconfidence in general knowledge. Therefore, Asian markets provide a worthy 
environment to test overconfidence hypotheses.  
The Tawainese Stock Exchange (TSE) is characterized by several characteristics 
that differentiate it greatly from the US stock markets. Because the TSE is an order-
driven call market, only limit orders are accepted. Every security listed on the TSE is 
traded through their Fully Automated Securities Trading (FAST) System, where there is a 
priority structure that is based on a strict price and time procedure dictating when orders 
are executed. Therefore, orders that are entered into the FAST system are fully executed 
before an order entered later is executed. Institutions in the TSE are classified into five 
categories: corporate institutions, financial institutions, mutual funds, securities dealers, 
and foreign investors (1627). 
In order to examine the trading behavior of investors in Taiwan, size and volume-
institutional portfolios were formed that were different in terms of institutional categories 
but similar in terms of trading volume and size. These low and high institutional 
ownership portfolios allow the researchers to effectively contrast the trading behaviors of 
individual investors compared to professional institutional investors. 
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The Bivariate Granger casualty test, which is helpful in determining whether a 
particular time series is useful in forecasting another, was used on each portfolio 
constructed. The results of these tests show that there is a significant and positive 
correlation between portfolio volume and lagged market returns in all portfolios (1643). 
This positive causal relationship is stronger for portfolios with low institutional 
ownership, compared to portfolios with high institutional ownership. In other words, the 
researchers found evidence that implies that market gains cause individual investors to 
trade more actively and frequently in successive periods compared to institutional 
investors. 
This study also found evidence that when the market is up, more liquid across 
market return regimes, and less volatile, both individual and institutional investors tend to 
trade more aggressively, which is consistent with the behavioral finance theory. It also 
shows that after market gains, only individual investors are more likely to underestimate 
risk and participate in riskier securities. Evidence also indicates that after market gains in 
low-volatile market environments, both individual and institutional investors trade more 
aggressively, when compared to highly-volatile market environments. Lastly, when the 
researchers compared the trading degrees between individual and institutional investors, 
they found that market gains not only made individual investors trade more during bull 
markets and up-momentum markets, but they also are more likely to actively trade in 
high-volatility market states compared to institutional environments. This research 
provides extensive evidence that individual investors demonstrate more overconfident 
trading behavior, and therefore are more overconfident than institutional investors (1643). 
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These conclusions from Chuang and Susmel (2011) are consistent with the 
findings of Gervais and Odean (2001), who determine that less-experienced individual 
investors tend to have more overconfident trading tendencies compared to more 
experienced institutional investors; as well as discoveries from Tekce and Yilmaz (2015), 
who found that overconfident behavior is common among individual stock investors, and 
that sophisticated investors are less prone to overconfidence.  
The results of Tekce and Yilmaz (2015) can be seen in Figure 4, providing 
evidence that individual investors exhibit high levels of overconfidence. By comparing 
the frequency of annual turnover, overconfidence is measured. Figure 4 shows that a 
substantial amount of individual investors have high turnover levels, which implies that 
these investors demonstrate a high degree of overconfidence. 
 
Figure 4: Frequency of annual turnover 
Source: Tekce, Yilmaz (2015) 
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Hsiang-His Liu, Wen-I Chuang, Jih-Jen Huang, and Yu-Hao Chen (2016) 
conducted a similar study, by exploring the relation between overconfident trading and 
stock return volatility. By using a double-threshold GARCH model, the researchers 
analyzed the Taiwanese stock market and examined the overconfident trading behavior of 
institutional investors compared to individual investors. They analyze the impact that an 
investors’ over confident trading behavior has on stock return volatility. By using the DT-
GARCH model, the researchers are able to estimate the threshold value of market gains, 
as well as the relation between stock return volatility and overconfident trading. As a 
result, the researchers determine if there is a variance in the degree of an investors’ 
overconfident trading outside of the threshold. 
The results of this study reveal that investors trade more overconfidently in high 
market return regimes, causing return volatility to be higher in this type of environment. 
The results suggest that higher overconfident trading leads to higher return volatilities 
(538). Consistent with Chuang and Susmel (2011) and Barber and Gervais (2001), Liu, 
Chuang, Huang, and Chen (2016) also came to the conclusion that individual investors 
trade more overconfidently compared to institutional investors.  
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Chapter III: Investor Biases 
 When further analyzing the effects that behavioral biases have on investors and 
their financial decision-making, most studies analyze individual investors in developed 
markets and data that is limited to the subsamples of overall investor groups or a specific 
individual bias (516). However, Bulent Tekce, Neslihan Yilmaz, and Recep Bildik (2016) 
conducted the first study that focuses on nationwide data, while also accounting for each 
transaction on every stock to analyze multiple biases in one experiment. The researchers 
examined Turkey, an emerging market, and the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) in order to 
analyze demographic factors. By using a unique database, the researchers determine how 
these influences affect the behavioral biases of individual investors. Tekce, Yilmaz, and 
Bildik focus on the behavioral biases of every Turkish individual stock investor that 
could possibly have an effect on the portfolio selection process of the investors, to 
understand how prevalent these biases are, how the biases relate to each other, and what 
factors affect them.  
 
a.   Disposition Effect 
The first bias analyzed by Tekce, Yilmaz, and Bildik (2016) was the disposition 
effect. The disposition effect can be easily observed in equity trading, and is defined as 
the tendency to sell winners early and hold on to losers for too long (516). The 
researchers hypothesize that individual Turkish equity investors exhibit the disposition
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effect, and that more sophisticated investors are less prone to being driven by the 
disposition effect. This hypothesis is in line with Odean (1998), who found that investors 
demonstrate stronger tendencies to realize winners, rather than losers (516), as well as 
Shapira and Venezia (200), Brown et al. (2006), and Dhar and Zhue (2006), who all 
provide evidence that sophisticated investors exhibit less disposition effect. The 
researchers match every sell transaction with a buy transaction, and analyze each gain or 
loss. By calculating the realized gains and losses for each day a sell transaction takes 
place, the disposition effect is calculated. The results concur that not only is the 
disposition effect common among individual stock investors, but it tends to increase with 
age. There is also evidence that female investors exhibit the disposition effect more than 
male investors, and wealth tends to increase the disposition effect.  
Similarly, Alex Frino, Grace Lepone, and Danika Wright (2014) concluded that 
the disposition effect is more prevalent in women and older investors. They found 
corresponding evidence by using a large sample of individual investor accounts at a 
leading local retail brokerage. The results also imply that several behavioral biases tend 
to act as predictors of the disposition effect. Some of these include frequent trading, the 
investor’s level of diversification in their portfolio, and round size trading heuristics.  
Another seminal experiment conducted by Newton Da Costa Jr., Marco Goulart, 
Cesar Cupertino, Jurandir Macedo Jr., and Sergio Da Silva (2013) analyzed whether the 
disposition effect was more significant on experienced or unexperienced investors. In 
using experienced investors and undergraduate students (as the inexperienced investors), 
they were able to determine that both human subjects show the disposition effect. 
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However, the more experienced investors were less affected by it; these results are 
consistent with the numerous studies mentioned previously.   
Yan Li and Liyan Yang (2012) analyze the disposition effect by using it as a 
channel to also study the asset pricing and volume implications of prospect theory. The 
disposition effect is a highly studied trading behavior and was first defined by Shefrin 
and Statman (1985). The disposition effect is defined as the tendency of investors to be 
more likely to sell their assets with higher values since they were purchased, rather than 
sell their assets with lower values since purchase. As a potential explanation of the 
disposition effect, Li and Yang seek answers from the prospect theory. 
Prospect theory is a prominent theory of decision-making, first proposed in 1979. 
Prospect theory assumes three things: first, under this theory, investors evaluate outcomes 
based on their perception of gains and losses compared to a reference point (usually the 
purchase price), instead of evaluation of outcomes based on wealth. Investors tend to be 
loss averse, meaning they are more sensitive to losses, relative to gains of the same size. 
Lastly, investors have diminishing sensitivity tendencies, for gains they are risk-averse, 
and risk-seeking for losses. 
The third assumption (diminishing sensitivity) is often viewed as the underlying 
instrument of the disposition effect. An investor would be likely to sell a stock if it is 
being traded at a gain, because the investor is highly risk averse. And vice versa, if a 
stock is currently being traded at a loss, the investor would be highly risk-seeking, and 
therefore would tend to hold on to the stock. Li and Yang (2012) build a general 
equilibrium model for the purpose of examining the repercussions of prospect theory for 
the disposition effect, trading, pricing, and volume.  
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The results concluded by Li and Yang (2012) imply that a time-varying risk 
attitude story links the prospect theory to disposition effect, prices, and volume. Because 
of diminishing sensitivity, a prospect theory investor’s risk aversion is positively 
correlated to stock returns, which causes a disposition effect. The positive relation 
between risk aversion and stock returns also results in price momentum, a positive 
correlation between return and volume, and reduced volatility of returns. Although the 
disposition effect can result in a positive correlation between return and volume, when 
the disposition effect is weaker, the correlation tends to be stronger. The general 
equilibrium model shows that a reversed disposition effect and price reversal for stocks 
with normal dividends tends to be predicted by a general equilibrium model. 
 
Figure 5: A hypothetical value function: 
Source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
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b.   Familiarity Bias 
 A defining property of familiarity bias is when people are offered two different 
alternatives, individuals tend to favor the one with which they are familiar. This defining 
property carries over to investment decisions, Merton (1987) developed the capital 
equilibrium model, which implies that investors make their investment decisions based 
on the stocks with which they are familiar (517). In regard to the familiarity bias, the 
researchers predict that a significant portion of individual investors invest in stocks they 
are familiar with, and that sophisticated investors exhibit a lower degree of familiarity 
bias. Familiarity bias is measured based on previous ownership under the assumption that 
after an investor buys a stock, the stock in turn becomes more familiar. Therefore, higher 
previous ownership indicates a higher tendency for familiarity bias. The results from this 
data imply that familiarity bias is prevalent in individual Turkish investors, and is higher 
among males and younger investors. It was also found that investors hailing from more 
developed regions are less likely to exhibit familiarity bias when compared to those from 
less developed regions. It also should be noted that the researchers found supporting 
evidence that Turkish individual stock investors do not chase stocks with positive past 
returns.  
 Similarly, Bulipopova, Zhdanov, and Simonov (2014) investigate the impact of 
the familiarity bias on the individual investor’s reluctance towards realizing losses. The 
researchers conducted a total of 714 different tests, in which different participants could 
sell two different stocks (winners and losers). One group of participants had owned 
familiar assets and the other group of participants worked with completely new 
portfolios. This experiment yields results that show an individual investor’s tendency to 
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hold onto losers too long is almost twice as high for unfamiliar stocks (as can be seen in 
Figure 6), compared to when the assets are familiar to the stock holder. Because the level 
of familiarity increases an investor’s reluctance to sell off their losing stocks, this could 
protect the issuer’s market capitalization. Holders of familiar stocks are better able to 
support the stock’s price, and most likely prevent it from plummeting.  
 
Figure 6: Brief Experimental Results: 
 
*RG=realized gains; RL= realized losses; PRG= proportion of realized gains; 
PRL=proportion of realized losses 
Source: Bulipopova, Zhdanov, Simonov (2014) 
 
 Huberman (2001) found that familiarity bias leads to the home country bias, 
where investors simply prefer to invest in familiar stocks and ignore the principle of 
portfolio theory’s advice to diversify. When an investor is selecting his/her portfolio, 
he/she are trying to maximize their wealth, and in order to avoid assuming too much risk, 
investors typically diversify their portfolios. Kang and Stulz (1997) observe that 
normally, investors will benefit greatly from international diversification, yet most 
individuals tend to ignore this and only invest in their home countries.  
 The results of this study imply that investors do not optimize along objective risk-
return trade-offs. Instead, by exhibiting familiarity bias, investors tend to shy away from 
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foreign stocks and concentrate their portfolios on stocks they are familiar with – whether 
that is within their home country, their own company’s stock, or stocks that are discussed 
favorably in the media.  
 
c.   Status Quo Bias 
 Status quo bias tends to be evident when individuals prefer things to stay in their 
current state by not changing anything, or by using a previously made decision as a 
baseline, or status quo, to maintain one’s current decision (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 
(1988). For example, since there are several alternatives in terms of equity investments, 
in order to prevent facing the difficulties of making decisions, individuals could exhibit 
status quo bias and maintain their current standings. Overconfidence and status quo bias 
have inverse relationships with investor trading. While men tend to be more 
overconfident than women (Barber and Odean 2001), women exhibit a higher degree of 
status quo bias than men.  Tekce, Yilmaz, and Bildik (2016) hypothesize that a portion of 
stock investors exhibit status quo bias and keep their portfolio positions unchanged, 
women display a higher degree of status quo bias than men, and sophisticated investors 
demonstrate less status quo bias compared to less sophisticated individuals.  
 To measure status quo bias, end of day portfolios were constructed for each 
investor using all buy and sell transactions. The more an investors’ portfolio changes, the 
more decisions the individual makes, and less status quo bias is demonstrated. Portfolio 
percentage change was measured every day, therefore, higher portfolio percentage 
changes indicate lower status quo bias. The results show that demographic characteristics 
affect status quo bias in the opposite direction than does overconfidence (524), which is 
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consistent with the findings from Tekce and Yilmaz (2015). It was also found that status 
quo bias is more evident in female investors, increases with age, and investors that 
exhibit status quo bias have higher trade performance.  
 Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1998) experimentally determine the presence of the 
status quo bias in financial decision making. The researchers examined individuals by 
forming a questionnaire that consists of a series of decision problems requiring a choice 
to be made from a fixed number of alternatives. Preferences were controlled, and the set 
of choice alternatives were held constant. Choices were either neutrally framed or framed 
under the status quo. For neutral framing, a list of potential alternatives was presented, 
with no labels attached. Every option was equal to each other. For status quo framing, 
one specific choice alternative was placed in a “status quo position”, therefore making the 
others alternatives to the status quo. For some experiments, the researchers manipulated 
the status quo condition. For the remaining, the status quo option was selected 
subsequently by the participant’s initial choice. 
 Both parts of the experiment show that status quo framing has significant and 
predictable effects on an individuals’ decision making. Samuelson and Zeckhauser 
(1998) found that across a diverse range of decisions, participants exhibit substantial 
status quo bias. The degree of the bias was correlated with the strength of the 
participant’s partiality, as well as with the number of alternatives given in the set of 
choices. If an individual’s preference for a select alternative was strong, the bias was 
weaker; and the greater the number of options presented in the set of choices, the more 
apparent was the relative bias for the status quo. 
	  
	  
39	  
 Alexander Kempf and Stefan Ruenzi (2006) examine the status quo bias and its 
effects in the mutual fund market, specifically focusing on whether or not the status quo 
bias is dependent on the number of alternatives offered, by analyzing how cash inflows 
into a specific mutual fund depend on prior influxes into the same fund. Mutual fund data 
was gathered for all United States equity mutual funds from 1993 to 2001. The number of 
alternatives for mutual fund investors in each segment is measured by the number of 
funds in that particular segment, and because this number varies among the different 
segments, the researchers can analyze the relation between number of alternatives and the 
status quo bias in a real-world situation.  
 Kemkpf and Ruenzi (2006) not only found a positive correlation between 
previous growth and current growth in mutual fund segments with a large number of 
funds, but also in segments of the industry that are smaller. The researchers noted that 
this influence is extremely stable, and is not affected by the specific model chosen. These 
results imply that the status quo bias in repeated decisions strongly depends on the 
number of relevant alternatives. Therefore, the status quo bias is more significant in 
segments where there are more mutual funds to choose from, which is consistent with the 
findings of Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1998) previously discussed. 
 
d.   Confirmation Bias 
 Stock message boards have become increasingly prevalent when trying to 
determine investor behavior tendencies because they are becoming a popular platform for 
investors to clarify, pursue, and exchange information. The increasing popularity and use 
of message boards has caused questions regarding how investors use the information they 
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gather from these message boards to, in turn, make financial decisions. The study 
conducted by JaeHong Park, Prabhudev Konana, Bin Gu, Alok Kumar, and Rajagopol 
Raghunathan (2010) investigates “how investors process message board information and 
analyzes the impact of their information gathering activities on their return expectations 
and investment performance”. By analyzing how investors process information, the 
researchers are better able to understand if these message boards are detrimental or 
beneficial to investors and their investment decision making abilities.  
This study is beneficial to understanding behavioral finance and investors 
irrational tendencies because the researchers develop several hypotheses motivated by the 
confirmation bias. Confirmation bias is defined as the tendency to process certain 
information by interpreting the information in a way that is consistent with one’s existing 
beliefs.  
By analyzing if psychological factors influence how individuals process 
information from virtual communities, it can be determined if this behavior influences 
investment expectations and even actual performance. In order to answer these questions, 
the researchers hypothesize that investment-related virtual communities (i.e. stock 
message boards) will not benefit investors because it is likely they are exhibiting 
confirmation bias and seeking information that aligns with their prior beliefs. Since the 
information posted on virtual communities are likely to reinforce prior beliefs, investors 
will feel a sense of overconfidence thus be more prone to excessive trading, as previously 
detailed. This behavior would lead to less informative investment decisions, and cause 
lower returns.  
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 A field experiment on investors that use Naver.com, the largest online portal 
website in South Korea and also popular virtual message board community, was used to 
test these hypotheses. 502 participants were examined first by completing an online 
questionnaire, including questions on specific stocks related to the stock message board 
such as their opinion of the stock, current investment amount, and expected return. To 
measure the degree of the investors’ confirmation bias, specific messages were posted on 
the message boards, and participants were asked a series of questions relating to which 
message appeared to have the most convincing argument, most support, and which is 
most strongly backed by information from the stock. Investors that possessed a sense of 
confirmation bias, were more likely to be drawn to the messages consistent with their 
beliefs.  
 The results of this experiment show strong evidence that investors inefficiently 
process information from stock message boards and heavily exhibit confirmation bias. It 
was found that investors containing strong prior beliefs are far more likely to accept 
opinions that coincide with their own from virtual communities. This study also indicates 
that investors who are driven by stronger confirmation bias tend to exhibit more 
overconfidence and perceived competence, which in turn adversely affects their 
investment performance because the investors trade more often, have higher expectations 
about their performance, and have lower realized returns, as seen in Figure 7 and Figure 
8. 
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Figure 7: The Main Conceptual Model 
Source: Park, Gu, Kumar, Raghunathan (2010) 
 
 
Figure 8: Conceptual Model for Overconfidence and Perceived Competence 
Source: Park, Gu, Kumar, Raghunathan (2010) 
  
When individuals seek new information, the search procedures are usually biased 
in favor of their preexisting expectations, beliefs, or desired conclusion. Abundant 
research has shown that after people make a decision, they typically prefer supporting 
information over conflicting information. Eva Jonas, Stefan Schulz-Hardt, Dieter Frey, 
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and Norman Thelen (2001) conduct a total of four experiments, that were designed to 
investigate if confirmation bias in the evaluation of information occurs when information 
is presented and analyzed sequentially. 
 The first experiment involved comparing sequential information seeking with 
simultaneous information seeking, in order to evaluate if a confirmation bias can be 
observed for both procedures. A group of thirty-six students volunteered to participate 
and were tested through a questionnaire that was created by the researchers. The results 
of this first experiment show that biased information extends to situations where 
information is processed sequentially. The researchers also found that the confirmation 
bias was significantly stronger for sequential information seeking condition than the bias 
in the simultaneous condition. 
 The second experiment analyzes two questions. The first questions if the stronger 
confirmation bias in sequential information search can be replicated, compared to 
simultaneous information search. If the answer to the first question is yes, the researchers 
wonder if the effect is due to different information presentation, or if it is the result of 
different information processing in sequential search versus simultaneous search. The 
results from the second experiment replicated the results of the first, that the confirmation 
bias is stronger when the information search is performed sequentially, versus 
simultaneously. The researchers also prove that the strength of the confirmation bias is 
independent of the processing mode. If the information was presented sequentially, rather 
than simultaneously, the confirmation bias was stronger.  
 The third experiment was created to directly test the biasedness restriction 
hypothesis. The researchers tested the biasedness restriction hypothesis by assuming that 
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if people are trying to not be too biased, they first seek their information in the sequential 
presentation mode, then if the articles are subsequently presented simultaneously, they 
will use this second phase to counteract their bias exhibited in the first phase. The results 
of the third experiment strongly contradict the biasedness restriction hypothesis. Even 
after the individuals were given the chance to realize their bias and counteract it in the 
next simultaneous phase, they did not. 
 Lastly, the fourth experiment tested the focus hypothesis in two different ways. 
First off, a participant could try to induce a decision focus in the simultaneous condition, 
in order to see if the subsequent confirmation bias becomes as strong as it does in the 
sequential condition. The researchers chose the second way to test the focus hypothesis, 
where instead of provoking a decision focus in simultaneous information search, one 
could also try to remove the decision focus in the sequential condition in order to 
evaluate whether the confirmation bias in sequential information search decreases relative 
to the level of the simultaneous search condition. The results of this experiment strongly 
support the decision focus hypothesis. It was found that if an information focus 
hypothesis was induced in the sequential condition, the effect of presentation mode 
disappears. In other words, the researchers provide strong evidence that implies the 
increase in strength of the confirmation bias under sequential presentation, is the result of 
an increased commitment due to the participant’s heightened focus on their decision. 
 Brad M. Barber and Terrance Odean (2001) explore how the internet is changing 
the way information is delivered to investors, and the ways in which investors can base 
their decisions off of this information. Regarding confirmation bias, the focus of their 
study is arguing against the proposition that more information leads to better decision 
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making, because it relies on the applicability of the information to the investment 
decision and how well-equipped the decision maker is to use the information. 
 Barber and Odean (2001) suggest that because of the Internet, there have been 
transformations in investing that increases the overconfidence of on-line investors by 
providing an illusion of knowledge and control, also changing the decision criteria for 
investors. The researchers argue that a greater increase in volume and variety of 
information will more likely increase the illusion of knowledge. Investors are more 
probable to be impressed by the arguments that they already agree with, meanwhile 
discounting any opposing views. Barber and Odean also argue that due to the Internet, 
people will actively seek out confirming evidence by visiting chat rooms of similar-
minded investors, and are likely to be convinced by those with whom they already have 
corresponding beliefs. The researchers also find that investors who believe acquiring 
more information makes them superior investors are not likely to seek out or 
acknowledge evidence that indicates against their beliefs. Therefore, on-line investors 
exhibit greater confirmation bias, in turn, making them more overconfident investors. 
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Chapter IV: Environmental Influences 
It has been argued through several clinical psychological studies that weather has 
significant impact on human behavior, explaining the changes in mood that occur on 
cloudy or rainy days versus sunny days. There is no doubt that the presence of sunshine 
impacts one’s mood, which has led researchers to question whether the weather affects 
the stock market. The traditional efficient market view would assume that it is unlikely 
that the occurring weather outside of the stock exchange should affect the rational price 
of the nation’s stock market index.  
A contrasting view incorporates the idea that since sunlight positively affects one’s 
mood, individuals most likely tend to evaluate future prospects more optimistically when 
they are in better moods compared to when they are in bad moods. If an investor’s good 
mood extends to investments, they could subconsciously relate this feeling to favorable 
life prospects. Therefore, misattribution of investors could potentially affect the stock 
market and cause stock prices to fluctuate in response to the mood of investors. Investors 
in better moods see positive material as more noticeable and available than negative 
material, which is not exactly rational and contrasts greatly with traditional efficient 
market views.  
The idea that external influences, such as weather, can affect the stock market differs 
with many accepted patterns of stock return. Therefore, causing an inconsistency between 
psychological and rational explanations, which is why examining the effects of   
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weather on the stock market is an effective way to test if psychological biases can affect 
stock returns.  
 
a.   Seasonal Affective Disorder 
Several external influences, such as environmental factors, have also been studied 
due to their effects on financial decision making. For example, seasonal affective disorder 
(SAD) has been linked with depression and is a condition that has been known to affect 
several people during the seasons in which there are fewer hours of daylight. Several 
psychological experiments have shown a clear correspondence between lowered risk-
taking behaviors and depression in several settings, including financial.  
 In research performed by Norman E. Rosenthal, he found that approximately 10 
million Americans were suffering from SAD, and 15 million more endure a milder form 
of SAD known as “winter blues”. In a clinical sense, SAD is defined as a form of major 
depressive disorder (2). In the National Institute of Mental Health study by Robert M. 
Cohen et. al. (1992), positron emission tomography (PET) scans revealed that 
abnormalities in the prefrontal and parietal cortex areas were caused as the result of 
diminished daylight. In other words, it has been scientifically and biologically proven that 
shorter days can lead to depression in certain individuals. SAD symptoms, such as social 
withdrawal, lethargy, loss of energy, sleep disturbance, and several others, usually begin 
to appear around the time of the autumn equinox in September (Steven C. Dilsaver, 
1990).  
 Research has also been performed that has correlated a direct link between 
depression and increased risk aversion tendencies. Risk taking tendencies are measured 
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by using a scale of “sensation seeking” propensity, developed by Marvin Zuckerman 
(1994). Studies have shown that levels of depression and anxiety are related to one’s 
willingness to take a risk. An individual with greater anxiety or depression is less willing 
to take risk, and has reduced sensation seeking behavioral tendencies.   
 In “Winter Blues: A SAD Stock Market Cycle” Mark Kamstra, Lisa Kramer, and 
Maurice Levi (2002) investigate the role SAD plays on stock market returns. The 
researchers gather information on daily stock index return data obtained through four 
indicators in the United States and eight from other countries, chosen explicitly to 
represent large economies at different latitudes in both hemispheres. Indicators in 
Australia, Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden 
were chosen specifically to control for market seasons and other environmental factors, 
and daily percentage returns and indexes were analyzed for each country over a period of 
time.  
The results of this experiment found overwhelming evidence the proves the 
existence of SAD on stock market returns around the world. The results conclude that 
stock returns are significantly related to the amount of daylight throughout fall and 
winter. The returns for the United States indices are significantly lower in the September-
November months compared to the rest of the months, as seen in figure 9. The link 
between seasonal depression and seasonal variation can also be seen in different patterns 
regarding the different latitudes. Markets residing in a higher latitude show more defined 
SAD effects, while the results obtained from the Southern Hemisphere (lower latitude) 
are six months out of phase when compared to the Northern, in line with the seasons.   
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Figure 9: Individual plots of data for each of the United States Indices: 
Source: Kamstra, Kramer, Levi (2002) 
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The effects of SAD have also been observed in terms of if this condition affects 
investors’ immediate reactions to earnings announcements and post earnings 
announcement drift (PEAD). In the study by Mei-Chen Lin (2013), it was found that 
investors tend to respond significantly more negatively when earnings are announced in 
the fall, the most prominent season of SAD, compared to the others. This is due to the 
fact that when individuals are suffering from SAD, their general level of pessimism tends 
to increase. In turn, an investors’ willingness to take risk may decrease, causing them to 
trade less and with more caution – even when hearing good earnings surprises. Mei-Chen 
Lin found that the effects of SAD cause trading volume to be lower in the fall, and 
investors are more willing to hold risky investments in the following seasons where there 
is an increase of hours of daylight in the winter.   
 Results from Mei-Chen Lin (2013) resonate with results obtained by Symeonidis, 
Daskalakis, and Markellos (2010) who similarly found that good mood is associated with 
increased trading and volatility. 
 Dolvin, Pyles, and Wu (2009) extend research on SAD by examining the potential 
effect of the disorder on stock analysts’ earnings estimates. By analyzing the error in 
stock analyst’s annual earnings estimates compared to actual earnings from 1998-2004 
and concentrating specifically on pessimistic bias associated with SAD, the researchers 
hypothesize that earnings estimates made during SAD periods (fall and winter months) 
will be associated with a pessimistic bias when compared to estimates made during other 
times of the year (spring and summer months).  
 The researchers found strong evidence of increased pessimism in analysts’ 
estimates during fall and winter and more significant pessimism for analysts located in 
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Northern states, which are most likely to be influenced by a reduction in daylight and the 
depression that it causes. However, since analysts’ estimates typically show an optimistic 
bias, SAD and its associated pessimism actually has the potential to offset the existing 
positive bias, and cause analyst estimates to be more accurate.  
 Although initial public offerings (IPOs) are intentionally underpriced, Keef, 
Keefe, and Khaled (2015) found that seasonal influences (SAD) cause IPOs to be even 
more underpriced. The reason for this is, as previously explained, changes in length of 
daylight lead to changes in moods of the investor or issuer, causing changes in asset 
prices. In this case, SAD leads to IPO underpricing to be more pronounced.  
 
b.   Hours of Sunshine 
Another obscure environmental factor that can affect an investors’ decision 
making abilities is the number of hours of sunshine per day, not dependent on season or 
time of year. It has been proven that sunshine has the ability to affect mood and shape 
behavior, leading Mitra Akhtari (2011) tested if weather is related to economic outcome 
and market returns. In order to study the relationship between the weather and equity 
prices over time, various measures of the change in weather and market return were 
taken. By using regressions from 1948 to 2010, the return on the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (DJA) index was compared to the daily cloudiness and lack of sunshine in New 
York City.  
Weather data was obtained through the National Climatic Data Center fo the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (www.ncdc.noaa.gov) for LaGuardia, 
New York City, due to its close physical proximity to Wall Street. Akhtari (2011) 
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measured the daily cloud cover, since hours of sunshine are inversely related to cloud 
presence, and constructed a variable that approximates daily levels of sunshine. Daily 
index returns were collected from the Dow Jones Industrial Average to measure market 
performance.  
 Results from the data indicate that the return on the DJI is not predicted by New 
York City weather. However, local cloud cover was found to be significantly correlated 
with the returns. Therefore, “the correlation between local weather and the close-to-close 
overnight return of the DJI can be attributed to how weather is related to within day 
return, as opposed to overnight return” (18).  Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) yielded 
similar results, concluding that the weather forecasts for a particular day that predict 
sunshine, do not cause an immediate positive stock price reaction. Instead, prices move 
due to the physical occurrence of sunshine.  
Akhtari’s (2011) results can further prove that since the effects of weather seem to 
be driven completely by the within day return, rather than overnight return, individuals’ 
psychological state is affected by the current weather. Because overnight return and 
weather are unrelated, it can be concluded that it is the present day’s existence of 
sunshine that drives the weather effect – not people’s forecasts regarding possible 
sunshine that day.  The conclusions from this study support several previous findings, 
and not only support the fact that stock prices are significantly correlated with the hours 
of sunshine on Wall Street, but also the view point that stock prices are influenced by 
investor psychology. These conclusions are similar to those found by Frühwirth and 
Sögner (2015), whose study also discovered that cloud cover influences the returns on the 
stock market.  
	  
	  
53	  
 The conclusions from this study correlates with the findings from Saunders 
(1993), who also showed that the returns on the New York Stock Exchange are 
negatively related to cloud cover in New York City.  Saunders’ results imply that the 
weather in New York City has a long history of correlations that has a significant impact 
on major stock indexes. Thus, supporting the view that investor psychology influences 
asset prices. This experiment demonstrates important information regarding how weather 
influences mood, and therefore the mood changes most people experience on sunny days 
versus gloomy days.  
 Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) evaluate the relationship, across 26 different 
countries from 1982 to 1997, between sunshine in the city of the country’s leading stock 
exchange and daily market index returns. Similar to previously mentioned studies, 
Hirshleifer and Shumway tested the hypothesis that sunshine affects returns by 
examining the relationship between daily cloudiness and daily nominal return on the 
nation’s stock index, for each city. Weather data was obtained from the International 
Surface Weather Observations (ISWO), and specifically examined for the measure of 
total sky cover (SKC). In order to rule out that the results were derived from well-known 
seasonal stock return effects, the researchers analyzed the deviation between the ordinary 
expected degree of cloudiness for that day of the year and the day’s actual cloudiness. 
Daily index returns were collected from Datastresam, and all cities that have data from 
1988 to 1997 are included in the study.  
The researchers find that daily stock returns are highly significantly correlated with 
sunshine, and after controlling for sunshine, it is determined that returns are unrelated to 
other weather conditions such as rain and snow. Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) 
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struggle with finding a rational explanation for why sunshine would predict later returns 
or why a sunny day near a country’s stock exchange is associated with high returns on a 
national market index. However, these results are consistent with the indication that 
sunlight affects mood, and mood affects prices. 
The researchers conclude that by becoming aware of their moods, investors can 
benefit by avoiding mood-based errors in judgment and trade decisions. Hirshleifer and 
Shumway (2003) also suggest broader implications regarding these results and asset 
pricing. In confirming the effect of mood on asset prices and noting that sunshine is just 
one of several influences on mood, this study implies that other mood effects may be 
important for understanding how people interpret markets in a broader sense.   
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Chapter V: Herd Behavior 
A fundamental principle of the classical economic theory is that individuals rationally 
form expectations to make investment decisions, and that these decisions are made by 
efficiently using all available information. Since humans, by nature, are influenced by 
others in almost every activity, it is possible this influence can affect financial and 
investment decisions. This view contrasts the classical economic theory, assuming that 
investments can be driven by group psychology where the influence of others may not be 
entirely rational, which in turn, weakens the correlation between market outcomes and 
available information.  
John Maynard Keynes (1936), in The General Theory, expresses views that investors 
may be hesitant to act according to their own beliefs, values and information, in fear that 
their contrasting behavior will harm their reputations as practical decision makers. 
Keynes suggests that professional executives will tend to “follow the herd” if there is 
apprehension about how others will evaluate their ability to make rational judgements. 
Herd behavior can have a significant impact on various settings, including the stock 
market and corporate investments. 
David S. Scharfstein and Jeremy C. Stein (1990) examine some of the forces that 
potentially result in herd behavior in investment decisions. By using a “learning” model, 
the researchers evaluate situations in which managers use their investment decisions to 
influence the labor market’s assessments regarding their ability. In this case, ability 
	  
	  
56	  
represents the manager’s aptitude for making decisions. Scharfstein and Stein assume that 
there are different types of managers. The first group is “smart managers”, who receive 
informative signals about the value of a specific investment. The second group is “dumb 
managers” who only receive noisy signals about the value of an investment. At first, the 
managers nor the labor market know if they are in the smart or dumb category. After the 
mangers have made an investment decision, the labor market has the ability to update its 
beliefs based on whether the manager’s behavior was different or similar to the behavior 
of the other managers, and whether or not the manager made a profitable investment. 
If managers follow the decisions of others, they will be more positively assessed, than 
if their behavior contrasts with the other managers. Therefore, if a manager makes an 
unprofitable decision, it is not as bad for his or her reputation when others make the same 
mistakes, because they can share the blame if there are unpredictable fluxes in the 
market. The “sharing the blame” effect arises due to the act that since smart managers are 
all observing truthful information, they tend to receive correlated signals. Meanwhile, the 
dumb managers are only observing unrelated noise, so the dumb ones do not receive 
correlated signals.  
If a manager decides to mimic the behavior of others, it is suggested to the labor 
market that they have received a signal that is related to the others, and therefore is more 
likely to be a smart manager. On the other hand, if a manager takes a contradictory 
position compared to others, the market perceives them to more likely be a dumb 
manager. Herd behavior is analyzed in this study because even if a manager’s private 
information regarding an investment has a negative expected value, the investor may still 
pursue it if others before them have. And conversely, the investor could potentially reject 
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the investments that they identify as having positive expected value, if others before him 
have also refused them. 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) found that managers possess herd behavior tendencies, 
by simply mimicking the investment decisions of other managers, and ignoring 
applicable private information under certain circumstances. The effects of herd behavior 
can occur in several settings, as a result of rational attempts by managers to improve their 
perceived reputations as decision makers. Apprehension concerning reputation is just one 
of the factors that influence herding. The “sharing the blame” effect is also a common 
component that causes managers to herd. Scharfstein and Stein’s results also imply that 
herding is more likely to occur when opportunities for managers are relatively 
unattractive, and when their compensation depends on absolute ability evaluations, rather 
than relative ability evaluations.  
Abhijit V. Banerjee (1992) conducts a similar study to Scharfstein and Stein (1990), 
but incorporates a different model to study herd behavior. By developing a simple model, 
Banerjee studies the rationale behind herd behavior decision making, and the further 
implications of it. The basic model is set up by using a population of agents, who each try 
to maximize asset returns, while remaining risk-neutral. The set of assets are indexed by 
numbers, and it is assumed that the excess return on one specific asset (i*) is greater than 
the return on all other assets. Therefore, all investors would want to invest on the higher-
return asset, but none of the participants know which one it is. If i* is selected by a 
decision maker, he/she will receive a signal. Banerjee assumes that some participants 
may have some prior investment knowledge, so they could potentially have an idea of 
which asset i* is.  
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The decision making procedure in this model is sequential, where one participant, 
chosen at random, makes their decision first. Next, the following participant, chosen at 
random, is allowed to watch the choice made by the previous person, and he/she make 
their investment decision. Therefore, the participants that follow can benefit by observing 
the information obtained from the previous participants’ investment decisions. However, 
whether or not the participant before was given the signal that they selected i* is not 
allowed to be known. The game continues, with each new participant making their 
decision based on the history of the past decision makers, and their own signal if they are 
given one. 
The results of this study show that the decisions made are characterized by extensive 
herding. Banerjee (1992) found that agents abandon their own signals and shadow others, 
even when they are not sure if the other person is correct. The consequence of this herd 
behavior is that investors base their decisions on previous incorrect investment choices. 
The implications of these results show that investment decisions are chosen by 
optimizing individuals, and are characterized by herd behavior. Therefore, investors are 
more likely to do what other investors are doing, instead of using their own private 
information, thus the resulting equilibrium of this behavior is inefficient. 
Omar Camara (2017) extends the study of herd behavior by examining the relation of 
herd behavior to the capital structure of firms for four major United States industries 
(manufacturing, construction, wholesale, and services). Specifically, by analyzing the 
likelihood firms exhibit herd behavior tendencies in the corporate finance decision 
making environment. 
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All firms in the Annual Compustat database from 1996 to 2015, with ten years of 
continuous data, were analyzed and their annual gross domestic product (GDP) was also 
examined from the World Bank database. The cross-sectional absolute dispersion 
(CSAD) approach was used in order to identify capital structure herding behavior within 
and across industries. The industry means capital structure for each year and the mean 
capital structure of the industry leader for each year were used to compute CSAD.  
Camara (2017) found that when analyzing industry median, during bear markets, 
there is significant evidence of herding in the Services industry. During bull markets, 
there is significant evidence of herding in the Manufacturing industry when leader criteria 
is incorporated. In terms of herding across industries, it was found that Manufacturing, 
Construction, and Services industries all herd around the Wholesale industry. The 
Manufacturing industry exhibited the most significant within industry herd behavior, 
compared to the other industries. The high level of herd behavior within the 
Manufacturing industry could be the fact that manufacturing firms’ long term capital 
structure strategy is to maintain an industry average capital structure, which would cause 
the participants in the Manufacturing industry to follow what the others are doing.  
Jayendu Patel, Richard Zeckhauser, and Darryll Hendricks (1991) analyze the annual 
debt-to-equity ratios for over 180 firms, from 1971-1989, to examine factors that may 
lead to herd behavior. “Free riding” in regards to obtaining information is the first reason 
they described. As the result of asymmetric information, investors with less or lower 
quality information and resources to acquire relevant information tend to imitate the 
decision choices of investors who are perceived to have higher quality and more relevant 
information. Proximity to the group may also be a reason that leads to herd behavior. A 
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closer proximity to the group may potentially offer protection against the costs associated 
with deviation from the herd, which is similar to the “sharing the blame” effect described 
by Scharfstein and Stein (1990). Lastly, investors tend to have a greater level of regret 
when their decision to diverge from the herd turns out to have a negative outcome. For 
example, if the deviating firm experienced financial ratios that fell below the industry 
average, they may be more likely to follow the group norm for subsequent circumstances.  
Rama Cont and Jean-Philippe Bouchaud (1998) use a basic model to examine the 
effects of imitation and herding for the statistical properties of price fluctuations and 
market demand. The goal of Cont and Bouchaud’s study is to analyze how the presence 
of herd behavior among market participants may potentially lead to large fluxes in the 
aggregate excess demand, which is portrayed by a heavy-tailed non-Gaussian 
distribution. Heavy-tailed distributions are described as probability distributions with 
non-exponentially bound tails. Therefore, the tails are “heavier” than a normal 
exponential distribution.  
The simple model used by Cont and Bouchaud (1998) provides a relation between the 
heavy tails observed in the distribution of herding behavior in financial markets and stock 
market returns, two well-known market phenomena. The results also specifically provide 
evidence of a link between the excess kurtosis, meaning excess sharpness of the peak of 
the frequency-distribution curve seen in asset yields, the inclination of market 
contributors to imitate each other, and the market order flow.  
As a result of the 1990s financial crises, several researchers have performed studies 
suggesting that herd behavior may be a cause for the fragility of financial systems and 
excess price volatility. Marco Cipriani and Antonio Guarino (2005) study herd behavior 
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in a laboratory market setting, where subjects receive private information regarding the 
value of a specific security, and are allowed to observe the history of past trades. After 
participants receive private information on the securities and their trading history, they 
are given the opportunity to sequentially choose if they want to buy, sell, or not trade the 
asset. 
Cipriani and Guarino (2005) detect the presence of herding by examining the way 
participants use their private information and respond to the decisions of the previous 
traders. The results show that in some circumstances, participants decide not to use their 
private information and choose not to trade. Where in other circumstances, participants 
ignore their private information to engage in contrarian behavior and trade against the 
market. The researchers believe that their results imply that in order to understand herd 
behavior in actual financial markets, reputational concerns or non-informational motives 
could be potential explanations, which is consistent with the study by Scharfstein and 
Stein (1990) previously discussed. 
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Conclusion 
After reviewing, researching, and synthesizing over 40 articles and academic 
studies on behavioral finance, I have concluded that investors do not always behave 
rationally. The gender of the investor is an important factor that seems to cause investors 
to not act completely rationally. As detailed in chapters I and II, several studies have 
shown that men, compared to women, tend to be willing to assume more risk in their 
investments, and display a higher degree of overconfidence, thus leading to excessive 
trading.   
 The disposition effect, familiarity bias, status quo bias, and confirmation bias are 
also all investor biases that cause individuals to make illogical investment decisions, and 
are not consistent with modern financial theories that assume investors act rationally. 
External environmental influences also have drastic effects on investors, including 
Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD), which is a possible explanation for why trading 
volumes tend to be lower in the fall months, when there is less sunshine. Lastly, several 
investors tend to possess herd behavior, by acting against their own beliefs or individual 
information, and “follow the herd” for fear that acting on their own intuition will harm 
their reputations as rational decision makers. 
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